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TRIBAL TREATY RIGHTS AND NATURAL 
RESOURCE PROTECTION:  THE NEXT CHAPTER 
UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON - THE CULVERTS CASE 
By Richard Du Bey 
Andrew S. Fuller 
Emily Miner*
 
The Earth and myself are of one mind.   
The measure of the land and 
the measure of our bodies are the same.”   
Nez Perce Chief, Hinmaton Yalatkit (Chief Joseph) 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Water is the lifeblood of our natural world.  How we use, 
regulate, and protect our water, and the habitat and fishery resources 
it sustains, reflects who we are as individuals, governments, and 
nations.  Pacific Northwest Tribes (“PNW Tribes”)2 have served as 
guardians of our natural resources since time immemorial.  In more 
recent times, over the last 150 years, the PNW Tribes have been 
forced to fight with individuals, businesses, and the state of 
Washington to protect and maintain their treaty rights to harvest 
enough salmon to feed their families.  While the PNW Tribes’ treaty 
rights to fish, hunt, and gather have been long-established, the state 
and federal government’s duty not to interfere with the PNW Tribes’ 
exercise of those treaty protected rights is less well defined.  
However, on June 11, 2018, the state of Washington’s duty not to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  Richard Du Bey is a Member Attorney at Ogden Murphy Wallace PLLC and 
Chair of the firm’s Tribal Government Practice Group. Andrew S. Fuller is an 
Associate Attorney at Ogden Murphy Wallace PLLC and focuses primarily on 
environmental and land use matters for tribal, municipal, and private clients. Emily 
Miner is an Associate Attorney at Ogden Murphy Wallace PLLC and focuses on 
land use issues for the firm’s municipal and telecommunications  
practice areas. 
2 The Tribes of Washington State that are parties to the Culvert Case proceeding 
include: Suquamish Indian Tribe, Jamestown S’Klallam, Lower Elwha Band of 
Klallam, Port Gamble Clallam, Nisqually Indian Tribe, Nooksack Tribe, Sauk-
Suiattle Tribe, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Squaxin Island Tribe, Stillaguamish Tribe, 
Upper Skagit Tribe, Tulalip Tribe, Lummi Indian Nation, Quinault Indian Nation, 
Puyallup Tribe, Hoh Tribe, Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakama Indian 
Nation, Quileute Indian Tribe, Makah Nation, and Swinomish Tribal Community. 
References to “PNW Tribes” shall mean all Tribes listed here.  
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interfere with the PNW Tribes’ treaty fishing rights was 
dramatically defined by the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Washington v. United States, which affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in favor of the plaintiffs.3 This decision recognized Plaintiff 
PNW Tribes’ enforceable right to protect fishery habitat as a 
component of their treaty fishing rights.4  
 The tribal fishing rights at issue in Washington v. United 
States were established in 1854 and 1855 by the Stevens Treaties.5  
In a series of eight treaties, then Governor Stevens negotiated with 
the PNW Tribes for the cession of the lands, surface waters, and 
marine areas they controlled in exchange for the small tracts of land 
which comprised their reservations and their “right of taking fish, at 
all usual and accustomed grounds and stations.”6  Ever since, the 
PNW Tribes have sought to clarify and exercise their treaty-based 
rights to fish.  The Washington v. United States case sets new 
precedent in that it recognized the PNW Tribes’ right to enforce an 
implied duty on the part of the state and federal governments to 
refrain from damaging natural habitats that support the PNW Tribes’ 
treaty protected resources, including fish, water, and game.7  
 In Section I of this article, we briefly review the historical 
circumstances and case law leading up to the recent decision in 
Washington v. United States.  Section II discusses the procedural 
history in the trial court, the 9th Circuit decision, and its review by 
the Supreme Court.  In Section III, we analyze the significance of 
the Supreme Court’s affirmation by an equally divided court, and in 
Section IV, we explore how this expansion of tribal treaty rights may 
be used by other treaty tribes to protect their treaties involving 
fishing, hunting, and gathering rights.  In Section V, we look into 
the future application of tribal treaty rights under the Superfund 
Statute, the Clean Water Act, and the National Environmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 
S. Ct. 735 (2018).   
4 Id. at 59. 
5 Northwest Indian Fisheries Comm’n, Treaties, https://nwifc.org/member-
tribes/treaties/ [https://perma.cc/2T9A-2DGU] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
6  Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, etc. (commonly known as Treaty of 
Medicine Creek), art. 3, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, See also Treaty with the 
Dwamish, Suquamish, etc., (commonly known as Treat of Point Elliot), art. 5, 
Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927;  See also Treaty with the S’’K;lallam (commonly 
known as the Treaty of Point No Point), art. 4, Jan. 26, 1855. 
7 Mason Morisset & Carly Summers, Clear Passage: The Culvert Case Decision 
as a Foundation for Habitat Protection and Preservation, 1 BELLWEATHER: THE 
SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. POL’Y 29, 34 (2009).   
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Policy Act, and in Section VI, we offer our view of the Culvert Case 
treaty claim model framework.  Finally, our conclusion is laid out in 
Section VII. 
A.   Treaty Rights Were Ignored from the Beginning 
Tribes have faced an uphill battle in exercising their treaty-
based fishing rights despite the fact that the treaties explicitly 
provide the right.  In the late 1880s, several members of the Yakama 
Tribe were forced to file suit to enforce their right to access off-
reservation fishing sites because a private landowner had fenced off 
sections of the Yakima River, preventing access to the Tribe’s 
traditional fishing grounds. 8 The trial court initially ruled in favor 
of the landowner, but the Supreme Court of the Territory of 
Washington reversed that decision, finding that the treaty created an 
equitable servitude on the land that was not ended by the transfer of 
land from the government to a private individual.9  A similar issue 
arose several years later when two brothers who owned land on 
opposite sides of the Columbia River obtained licenses from the 
state of Washington to operate several fish wheels that prevented 
passage of many of the salmon at Celilo Falls. There, the U.S. 
Attorney filed suit to enforce tribal treaty rights, and again the trial 
court upheld the landowners’ right to exclude others from their 
property. In 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision, 
holding that the applicable treaty reserved the tribal right to fish at 
traditional locations; therefore, when the government transferred the 
land the new owners could not obtain greater property rights than 
those acquired by the government through the treaty.10  Fourteen 
years later, in another case involving landowners preventing access 
to fishing grounds near Celilo Falls, the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed an injunction issued by the U.S. District Court in Oregon 
that prevented the landowners from excluding tribal members.11  
Significantly, this case also affirmed the tribal right to access fishing 
grounds outside of their ceded territory if it can be shown that the 
area was used for tribal resource gathering.12   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 United States v. Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. 88, 88–89 (1887). 
9 Id. at 97–98. 
10 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 383–84 (1905). 
11 Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919). 
12 Id. at 198–99. 
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Not only did PNW Tribes face significant resistance from private 
landowners and state authorities to access their usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds, but the number of fish also steadily 
decreased.  As the state developed and became more populated 
pressure on the fisheries increased.  In response, the State put in 
place fishing regulations and attempted to force the PNW Tribes to 
comply with those regulations.   
B.   The Fish Wars 
Though the PNW Tribes’ right to fish is protected by treaty, 
tribal members were initially  arrested when fishing off-reservation 
in the 1940s.13  In 1945, Billy Frank Jr., a member of the Nisqually 
Tribe who later became a prominent activist for treaty rights and 
also the long-term Chairman of the Northwest Indian Fisheries 
Commission, was arrested by game wardens at the age of fourteen 
for fishing with a net on off-reservation property owned by his 
family on the Nisqually River.14  Tensions continued to grow as the 
fish stocks declined due to increased harvests by unregulated 
commercial boats and new hydroelectric projects that impacted 
available habitat.15  By the 1960s, Billy Frank Jr.’s property, known 
as “Frank’s Landing”, was the site of unlicensed “fish-ins” where 
tribal members repeatedly returned to exercise their treaty rights 
despite numerous arrests and convictions.16  The cause began to 
draw national attention, and in a show of support to the Puyallup 
Tribe Marlon Brando was arrested for unlicensed fishing during a 
protest in 1964.17   
In September 1970, members of the Puyallup Tribe in boats 
wielding rifles and firing warning shots, challenged government 
authorities who approached their nets.18  A protester eventually 
threw a fire bomb onto a bridge to block the officials from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Charles Wilkinson, Messages from Frank’s Landing: A Story of Salmon, 
Treaties, and the Indian Way (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 
2000); Fay Cohen, Treaties on Trial (Seattle, WA: University of Washington 
Press, Seattle, 1986) 31. 	  
14 William Yardley, Billy Frank Jr., 83, Defiant Fighter for Native Fishing 
Rights, N.Y. TIMES (March 9, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/us/billy-frank-jr-fighter-for-native-
fishing-rights-dies-at-83.html 
15 Gabriel Chrisman, The Fish- Protests at Franks Landing (Autumn 2007), 
https://depts.washington.edu/civilr/fish-ins.htm#ref12  
16 Supra, note 14.  
17 Supra, note 15.	  	  
18 Id.  
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approaching, but the authorities eventually raided the group’s camp, 
breaking up the demonstration with clubs and tear gas.19  It was in 
this context that the federal government finally intervened on behalf 
of the PNW Tribes, suing the state of Washington for its failure to 
satisfy its obligations under the treaties.20 
C.   Puyallup I and II – the Supreme Court Recognizes Duty of 
the United States and the State of Washington to Not Degrade 
Tribal Fishing Rights 
 In what became known at Puyallup I and II, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that state regulation of fisheries for the 
purpose of conservation could be upheld so long as appropriate 
standards were met, with “fair apportionment” of fish between 
Indians and non-Indians.21  This ruling affirmed the PNW Tribes’ 
interpretation of their treaty rights and protected their “right to take 
fish” for both a living and food.  These decisions were significant 
because they implied a clear duty on the part of the state not to take 
actions that degrade the PNW Tribes’ treaty-based fishing rights.22  
D.   United States v. Washington – The “Boldt Decision” 
Clarifies Existence of Off-Reservation Treaty Rights 
 As fisheries declined, due at least in-part to habitat loss, the 
PNW Tribes asked the court to determine to what extent they could 
enforce the implied duty of the state to not degrade fishing or 
hunting habitats used under their treaty rights.  In 1974, in a case 
known as the “Boldt Decision,” Federal District Judge Boldt 
clarified the meaning of “fair apportionment” and the “right to take 
fish.”23  He found that the PNW Tribes had bargained for the right 
to continue fishing where they always had, regardless of whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Id.	  	  
20	  Id.	  	  
21 Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash. (Puyallup I), 391 U.S 392, 398 
(1968); Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44, 
48–49 (1973). 
22 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (holding that the right to take 
fish requires grantees of the state to allow tribe members access to the usual and 
accustomed fishing sites); United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) 
(holding the tribes had a treaty-based right to water for the purposes of the tribal 
reservation, including farming and fishing).  
23 United States v. Washington (The Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312, 332, 
392 (W.D. Wash. 1974). 
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that location was on their reservation or not.24 This decision 
acknowledged the role of the twenty treaty Indian tribes in Western 
Washington as co-managers of the salmon resource with the state of 
Washington and apportioned the fish between tribal and non-tribal 
fisherman, holding that PNW Tribes were entitled to fifty percent of 
the fish runs passing through the Tribes’ usual and accustomed 
fishing grounds.25   
 The case brought against the state was bifurcated for trial, 
and in 1980, Phase II of the case proceeded to trial. The federal 
government and tribal governments alleged than an environmental 
right to have the fisheries resource protected from adverse state 
action also arose by implication from the reserved right to harvest 
fish.26  Judge Orrick of the Northern Division of California held that 
there is an “implied environmental right” in the treaties.27  The Judge 
analogized the habitat right the tribes sought to the right of an 
implied reservation of water necessary for the protection of fish and 
farming recognized by the Winters Doctrine.28  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit dismissed the proceeding for procedural reasons, but made 
it clear that the issue would be reconsidered if the plaintiffs came 
forward with a specific case demonstrating the state’s obligations 
regarding habit protection.29 
II.   UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON – THE CULVERTS CASE 
 As Washington grew and a network of roads was built, the 
state constructed and maintained culverts under state roads and 
highways to divert water away from the roadways.  However, the 
culverts were often not designed or built to allow for fish to pass 
upstream to access their spawning grounds.  These culverts owned 
and operated by the state, directly contributed to the reduction of 
salmon runs by reducing available habitat that is essential to the 
reproductive cycle of anadromous fish.  This situation provided 
evidence supporting that the state was acting with the primary 
purpose or objective of affecting or regulating fish supplies that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Id. at 407. 
25 Id. at 343.  
26 United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 204–05. The Winters Doctrine holds that an implied reservation of water 
reserved the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. 
United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). 
29 United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) 
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protected by treaty – evidence the tribes did not have on appeal in 
Phase II of the Bolt Decision. 
A.   2001 District Court  
Based on the adverse impacts of culverts on the fisheries, in 
2001 the PNW Tribes, joined by the United States, asked the U.S. 
District Court to find that Washington State had a treaty-based duty 
to preserve fish runs and habitat at off-reservation fishing sites that 
were usual and accustomed places and to compel the State to repair 
or replace culverts that impede salmon migration.30  The PNW 
Tribes averred that a “significant reason for the decline of 
harvestable fish has been the destruction and modification of habitat 
needed for their survival” 31 and noted that the state’s own estimate 
was that removal of obstacles presented by blocked culverts would 
result in an annual production increase of 200,000 fish.32  
 District Court Judge Martinez found in favor of the PNW 
Tribes and held that while culverts impeding fish migration were not 
the only factor diminishing causing diminishment of upstream 
habitat, the state’s construction and maintenance of culverts that 
impede salmon migration had diminished the size of salmon runs 
and thereby violated the State’s obligation under the treaties.33  
While not explicitly imputing an affirmative duty to take any and all 
steps possible to protect fish habitat, the decision did cite Judge 
Orrick’s opinion for the basis that such a duty is implied and held 
that the State had to “refrain from building or operating culverts 
under state-maintained roads that hinder fish passage.”34 The 
decision incorporated the Ninth Circuit’s caveat that a remedy 
would only be granted on the basis of specific facts and 
circumstances of a particular complaint.35  
 Judge Martinez found that the intent of the parties to the 
Stevens Treaties was to ensure the PNW Tribes would be able to 
take fish in sufficient amounts to meet their subsistence needs 
forever.36  Thus, it is the State’s burden to show that “any 
environmental degradation of the fish habitat proximately caused by 
the State’s actions would not impair the Tribes’ ability to satisfy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 United States v. State of Washington, 2007 WL 2437166, at 2. 
31 Id. at 3. 
32 Id.  
33 United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166, at 10. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 5. 
36 Id. at 9. 
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their moderate living needs.”37  The term “moderate living” was 
interpreted to mean a measure securing fish in an amount so much 
as, but not more than necessary, to provide the Tribes with a 
livelihood.38 Based on that definition, Judge Martinez indicated that 
the PNW Tribes had provided sufficient evidence of a diminishment 
of salmon, and that the State’s actions were a direct cause of the 
diminishment, such that the PNW Tribes’ treaty rights had been 
damaged. Further, Judge Martinez ruled that the PNW Tribes did 
not have to “exactly quantify the numbers of missing fish” so long 
as there is evidence that the culverts are responsible for some portion 
of the proven decrease of fish runs.39 
B.   2013 District Court 
In light of the specific factual showing of lost fishing 
opportunities due to culverts that blocked the upstream migration of 
fish, in 2013, the District Court issued a permanent injunction 
requiring the State to significantly increase its efforts to remove and 
replace the State-owned culverts that have the greatest adverse 
impact on the fish habitat by 2030.40  The Court determined that the 
PNW Tribes’ treaty right to take fish includes protection of fish 
habitat from man-made degradation.  It found that culverts blocking 
the free passage of salmon upstream result in man-made degradation 
of the fish habitat. In coming to this conclusion, the District Court 
relied on the significant decrease in salmon stocks in Washington 
since 1985, specifically focusing on evidence demonstrating that 
barrier culverts block hundreds of thousands of salmon from 
traveling up freshwater rivers and streams to reach their spawning 
grounds. 
C.   2017 Ninth Circuit Decision 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s 
injunction with a unanimous 3-0 decision, which affirmed the 
District Court’s requirement for Washington State to repair or 
replace state-owned culverts prohibiting free passage of fish to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id. at 4, (citing United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 207 (1990)). 
38 Id. at 7. 
39 Id. at 3. 
40 United States v. Washington, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 29, 2013). 
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spawning grounds and other important habitats.41  In affirming the 
injunction, the District Court ruled that Washington State was 
obligated under the Stevens Treaties to ensure that there were 
enough fish available for the PNW Tribes to make a “moderate 
living.”42 Washington State petitioned the Ninth Circuit for both a 
panel and en banc rehearing but was denied.43 The dissenting 
minority of the en banc review issued an opinion and argued that the 
majority’s reasoning ignored the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Association, that the opinion was overly broad, and that if 
unchecked, could significantly affect natural resource management 
throughout the Pacific Northwest.44  The majority disagreed with 
each of those allegations, but because the Ninth Circuit declined to 
articulate a standard for “moderate living,” this standard may be the 
subject of future litigation.45 
D.   Review by the Supreme Court 
 In 2017, Washington State filed a petition for review of the 
Ninth Circuit decision with the Supreme Court.46 The Supreme 
Court accepted review and agreed to hear the following three issues: 
(1) whether the treaties guarantee the tribes a “moderate living” 
from salmon harvests; (2) whether the federal government is barred 
from bringing the suit because the federal government approved the 
design and implementation of the culverts for decades; and (3) 
whether the District Court’s injunction violates principles of 
federalism because there was no judicial finding of a clear 
connection between culvert replacement and tribal fishing.47 
The Justices who heard argument appeared particularly interested in 
identifying a clear test for determining treaty violations and in 
searching for some quantitative measure of habitat degradation that 
could serve as a standard for determining when state, local, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 970-76 (2017). 
42 Id. at 962. 
43 United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1018 (2017). 
44 Id. at 1024. 
45 Id. at 1020.   
46 State of Washington v. United States of America, WL 3600608 (9th Cir. 2017) 
cert. granted (No. 17-269). 
47 Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (No. 17-269), Clerk’s 
Letter of March 23, 2018, available at www.supremecourt.gov/qp/17-
00269qp.pdf    
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private activity would interfere with tribal fishing right.48 
Unfortunately, neither side would commit to an absolute percentage 
as a test for habitat degradation.  Considerable time was also spent 
discussing the scope of the District Court injunction, with 
Washington state contesting its factual premises.  Washington’s 
Solicitor General proposed a standard based on “a large decline in a 
particular river.”49   Attorneys for the United States and the PNW 
Tribes argued that the test should be whether the culverts caused a 
“substantial decline” in the salmon population.50  
 
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS  
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
	  
On June 22, 1018, the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Washington v. United States in a 4-4 
decision.51  The Justices were evenly split because Justice Kennedy 
had recused himself from hearing the case as he had previously 
heard a portion of the case when he sat on the Ninth Circuit.52   
When the Supreme Court reaches a tie, the lower court ruling 
generally stands; however, that does not mean that the lower court’s 
decision becomes the law of the land.53   
The Supreme Court’s first tie decision was in 1792. The 
case, Hayburn’s Case, required federal circuit courts to determine 
pensions for disabled revolutionary war veterans. The Supreme 
Court heard the case, but as it explained, “the Court being divided 
in opinion on that question, the motion was not allowed.”   The tie 
vote in Hayburn's Case did not result in the affirmance of a lower 
court decision but, rather, the denial of the Attorney General's 
motion. The principle embodied in the case, however, applies to 
situations where the Supreme Court reviews the decision of a lower 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
1832 (2018) (No. 17-269). 
49 Id. at 5.  
50 Id. at 39, 61. 
51 United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 
S. Ct. 735 (2018). 
52 John Eligon, A Victory For a Tribe That’s Lost Its Salmon, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11, 2018 at A12.  
53 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942) (explaining that an 
affirmance by equal division is binding on the parties to that litigation but to no 
one else). See also Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
234 n.7 (1987) (“Of course, an affirmance by an equally divided Court is not 
entitled to precedential weight.”). 
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court. Under the principle in Hayburn's Case, the “Supreme Court 
views itself as being unable to take affirmative action—including 
reversing the decision of a lower court—in the absence of a majority 
vote of the Justices.” Thus, a tie decision essentially binds only the 
particular parties in the case to obey what the lower court ruled. That 
said, if there is no existing authority on the law or the facts, a tie 
decision still carries persuasive authority in the form of the lower 
court’s decision.  For example, if another circuit hears a case with 
similar facts, it may look to the Ninth Circuit’s decision as 
persuasive authority.54   
If the Supreme Court were to hear a similar case, however, 
the Court’s decision will likely be significantly influenced by recent 
changes to the Court’s makeup, which now includes President 
Trump’s appointment, Brett Kavanaugh. Mr. Kavanaugh’s views 
regarding Indian Law are relatively unknown.  According to 
Mathew Fletcher, Professor of Law at Michigan State University as 
well as a citizen of Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians, Mr. Kavanaugh has written less than ten relevant opinions 
addressing tribal issues. Of those opinions, none “are overtly pro-
Indian or anti-Indian.”55 
In contrast, Justice Gorsuch’s tenure on the Tenth Circuit 
provided significant opportunities to address tribal issues.  While 
sitting on the Tenth Circuit, Justice Gorsuch wrote eighteen opinions 
related to federal Indian law or Indian interests and participated in 
an additional forty-two such cases.56  Rather than defer to agency 
interpretation, Justice Gorsuch has turned to canons of statutory 
construction, which suggests that he may look closely at specific 
treaty language when making determinations regarding the rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See Justin Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 245, 253 
(2016).. The author’s survey showed that tie votes have been rare and have 
averaged fewer than two occurrences per year. The survey also indicated that 
issues of importance are presented to the Court again very quickly. 
55 Rebecca Nagle, Brett Kavanaugh, The New Supreme Court Associate Justice 
Nominee, Should Be Questioned About Native Rights, NATIVE NEWS ONLINE, 
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reserved to Indian tribes.57 His previous experience with federal 
Indian law suggests that he may be both attentive to the details and 
respectful of the fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty as well 
as the federal trust responsibility.58   
IV. BUILDING UPON THE EVOLVING BODY OF FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW 
The Supreme Court has previously recognized implied rights 
beyond those expressly reserved within the treaties.  This 
precedential history offers context for the courts’ determination that 
implied resource habitat protection rights logically follow from 
adherence to the canons of treaty construction.59    
The 2017 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Washington 
specifically looked to water rights case law when the Court found 
an implied duty of the state to not degrade fish habitat.60 The water 
rights cases held that when interpreting the treaties, courts should 
infer a promise to “support the purpose of the Treaties.”61 In the 
water rights cases discussed below, this meant that even though an 
explicit promise to provide water or access to water was not written 
into the treaty, the courts found that the treaties carried an implied 
promise; otherwise, the purpose of the treaty would have been 
meaningless.62   
The 1908 Supreme Court decision in Winters was the first 
case to recognize the implied right to water.63  In the treaty that 
created the Fort Belknap Reservation, while there was no explicit 
reservation of water use on the reserved lands, the Supreme Court 
nonetheless inferred a reservation of water “sufficient to support the 
tribe” because without the reservation of water, the lands reserved 
for the Tribe were arid and practically valueless.64  “Between two 
inferences, one of which would support the purpose of the 
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58See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 790 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2015) (addressing 
issues of sovereignty); Ute Indian Tribe v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 
2016) (addressing issues of sovereignty); Fletcher v. U.S., 730 F.3d 1206 (10th 
Cir. 2013). 
59 Mason D. Morisett & Carly A. Summers, Clear Passage: The Culvert Case 
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agreement and the other impair or defeat it, the court chose the 
former.”65  
The Winters decision was later affirmed in United States v. 
Adair.  In Adair, The Klamath Tribe’s 1854 treaty promised that the 
Tribe would have the right to “hunt, fish, and gather on their 
reservation” but contained no explicit reservation of water rights. 66  
On the reservation, the Klamath Marsh provided the Tribe’s primary 
hunting and fishing areas and relied on a flow of water from 
Williamson River.67  Because game and fish in the Klamath Marsh 
depended on a continual flow of water, the treaty’s purpose would 
have been defeated without the flow.  In a decision foreshadowing 
the eventual decision regarding the impacts of culverts on fisheries 
in Washington, the Supreme Court inferred a promise of water 
sufficient to ensure an adequate supply of game and fish.68 
Cases involving treaty-reserved water rights have typically 
addressed surface waters.  However, in a case that is still before the 
courts, the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed, and the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari, regarding a trial judge’s determination that the 
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, located in California’s 
Coachella Valley, have a reserved right applying to groundwater.69  
Due to the arid environment in that area, the groundwater of the 
Coachella Valley aquifer has been essential for tribal irrigation and 
drinking water, and is also a key part of the Tribes’ ceremonial and 
spiritual traditions.  In May 2013, the Tribe filed suit against the 
Coachella Valley Water District and Desert Water Agency for 
damage caused by the water agencies’ ongoing overdraft of the 
Coachella Valley aquifer and its artificial recharge with untreated 
water imported from the Colorado River.70  The Tribe and the 
United States argued that under federal law the Tribe has a reserved 
right to enough water to fulfill its present and future needs, 
regardless of whether that water is surface or groundwater.71  The 
trial judge recognized the Tribe’s reserved water rights and ruled 
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69 Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 
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that under the doctrine of United States v. Winters, a tribal-reserved 
right may be satisfied with groundwater.72  In 2017, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed that decision, and the Supreme Court refused to 
hear an appeal from the water agencies.73  The parties agreed to 
approach the case in three phases and to address the following in 
turn: (1) whether the Tribe has a reserved or aboriginal right to 
groundwater (now complete—affirming the reserved right); (2) 
whether the Tribe’s reserved right to groundwater includes a water 
quality component, the standards for quantifying Tribe’s water 
rights, and whether the Tribe owns the pore space in the aquifer 
below its reservation; and (3) actual quantification of the Tribe’s 
groundwater and pore space rights within the aquifer, and 
potentially a determination of the water quality standard that must 
be met to fulfill the Tribe’s water right.74  Phase 2 of the case is 
currently before the trial court.75 
The treaty language at issue in United States v. Washington 
explicitly promises that the treaty secures the PNW Tribes’ right to 
fish such that there would be food forever.76  Thus, no such inference 
was needed.  However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision explicitly stated 
that even if the treaty had not contained the explicit promise of “food 
forever”, the Court would have inferred, as in Winters and Adair, a 
promise to support the purpose or intent of the treaties.77 
V. TRIBAL TREATY RIGHTS - WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  
A.   Bringing Claims 
United States v. Washington has the potential to create a new 
platform from which Tribes may assert their treaty rights.  The case 
builds on strong precedent and outlines a clear strategy for bringing 
treaty-based claims. United States v. Washington could be used to 
support the ability of tribes to protect their direct (the reserved right 
to hunt, fish, gather, etc.) and indirect resources (protection of 
habitat that ensures continued access to the named right) guaranteed 
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under the treaty.  The decision could have broad implications for 
other government or private entities that own, manage, or control 
barriers—including tide gates, floodgates, and dams—if it can be 
demonstrated that those things block or diminish a treaty-guaranteed 
right to hunt, fish, or gather a natural resource.  This decision creates 
a foundation to argue for a de facto environmental servitude on the 
part of the state and federal government, once a tribe can establish 
that a state action causes significant decreases in the tribe’s ability 
to hunt, fish, or gather their named resource under the treaty.  This 
narrow focus may actually make the decision less vulnerable to 
reversal by future courts because there is a definitive standard that 
tribes must meet in order to bring a duty-based treaty resource claim. 
In order to bring a successful duty-based treaty resource claim, 
tribes will need to have a treaty-reserved right to fish, game, or other 
natural food source that then creates an inference of an implied duty 
by the state to protect the natural habitat that supports the direct 
resource protected under the treaty.78   
As an example of expanding the scope of this decision 
beyond just the PNW tribes in the Culverts Case, the Chippewa 
Tribes have a treaty reserved right similar to the PNW Tribes.  The 
1837 Treaty explicitly states that the Chippewa Tribes retain the 
privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the 
lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, but 
such privilege is at the pleasure of the President.79  So long as the 
Chippewa can identify a diminishment of the wild rice and aver that 
a significant reason for the diminishment is the state’s destruction 
and modification of the habitat where the wild rice grows, it is likely 
that a court will find an implied duty on the part of the state to ensure 
that the amount of wild rice within the habitat is enough to provide 
for a moderate living. 
B.   Application under the Superfund Program 
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), for wastes left 
on-site, remedial actions must comply with federal environmental 
laws that are legally applicable or are relevant and appropriate under 
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the circumstances of the release.80  In addition, Superfund remedial 
actions must comply with state environmental or facility siting laws, 
provided that state requirements (1) are promulgated; (2) are more 
stringent than federal laws; and (3) are identified by the state in a 
timely manner. 81 These standards, which must be met, are called 
applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs).   
The decision in Washington v. United States may be 
interpreted to establish treaty-related ARARs that prohibit the 
diminishment of treaty-reserved tribal resources. In the appropriate 
context, treaties should be found to establish ARARs because 
treaties to which the United States is a party are equivalent in status 
to federal legislation and form part of what the Constitution calls 
“the supreme Law of the Land.”82  Where the implied obligation to 
protect indirect resources under a treaty is not met by existing 
federal or state laws, the treaty’s requirements can be read as a 
federal environmental law applicable as an ARAR if the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is notified by the affected 
tribe of the obligation under the Clean Water Act (CWA).83 This 
could help tribes ensure that the cleanup of contaminated sites, 
either on or off the reservation, is performed to a standard that is 
protective of their direct and indirect treaty-based resource rights. 
C.   Application under the Clean Water Act 
Under the CWA, the federal government has an obligation 
to establish water quality standards (WQS), which provide the 
regulatory and scientific foundation for protecting water quality 
under the CWA.84  WQS not only set water quality goals for specific 
water bodies but also serve as the regulatory basis for establishing 
water quality-based treatment controls and strategies. The authority 
to develop WQS can be delegated to states and tribes, but the EPA 
must approve all proposed standards before they are applicable 
under the CWA.85 
The decision in Washington v. United States may provide a 
tool to allow tribes to push for the establishment of more stringent 
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WQS based on the federal and state obligation to protect the indirect 
resources supporting the treaty-reserved resources. Where a 
proposed WQS fails to protect those resources, the approval of the 
WQS would result in a violation of the treaty-based obligations 
addressed in Washington v. United States. 
D.   Application under the National Environmental Policy Act 
and Related State Acts 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
local State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) both present 
opportunities to pro-actively apply the Washington v. United States 
decision.  It holds that governmental agencies and third parties 
cannot take actions that diminish a tribe’s right to a reserved or 
implied treaty right.86  The most efficient way to ensure that those 
rights are considered is to add a requirement into NEPA and SEPA 
environmental checklists requiring applicants to prove that their 
proposed development will not diminish a reserved or implied tribal 
right.   
By placing the tribal rights review requirement into the 
permitting documents, concerns of whether a proposed development 
will affect tribal rights in the future is addressed preemptively.  This 
creates a place for tribes to be at the negotiating table and provide 
an opportunity for cooperation that could preemptively avoid 
protracted, uncertain, and costly litigation.  
VI. THE CULVERT CASE MODEL 
Despite the Culverts Case’s ability to augment certain types 
of claims, there are three overarching potential limitations on the 
scope of the decision’s ability to create a successful new pathway 
for tribal claims. The first limitation is the fact-specific inquiry that 
must be conducted.  The second limitation is the lack of a definitive 
standard for what amounts to a “moderate living.”87 This is 
concerning because “moderate living” standards can change 
depending on the resource that must be protected, and it affects what 
duty the state and third-party actors must take to mitigate or remedy 
the degradation. Finally, the third limitation is determining what an 
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appropriate remedy would be for any future cases. In United States 
v. Washington, a clear remedy was available based on the allegations 
brought, but due to the complexity of environmental damages 
claims, determining remedies is never easy.  
The PNW Tribes’ and federal government’s arguments 
proved successful in part because the PNW Tribes established that 
state-owned road culverts were causing a substantial decrease in the 
number of salmon to which the PNW Tribes were entitled. There 
was a clear decrease in the protected resource—salmon, the state’s 
duty was identified, and the PNW Tribes presented sufficient 
evidence of causation on the part of the state that caused the decrease 
in their protected resource.88 Accordingly, successful application of 
the principles in the Culverts Case elsewhere will likely require (1) 
a similar fact-specific inquiry in order to determine the baseline 
level of unimpaired resources, services, and evidence of the decline 
in a treaty protected resource; (2) a duty on the part of the state or 
third-party to protect or not degrade the resource; and (3) sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate the state or third party’s actions caused or 
contributed to the decline in the treaty-protected resource.  
Furthermore, because neither the District Court nor the 
Ninth Circuit defined the “moderate living” standard, the Supreme 
Court’s tie decision leaves open the extent of the state’s duty in any 
particular case.  While Washington State tried to argue that a 
definition was needed in order to establish the extent of its duty, the 
courts found that in this case a definition was not needed in order to 
find a duty on the part of the state.89 However, because this term was 
not defined, the extent of the state’s duty must be determined on a 
case by case basis.  
Finally, the question of what an appropriate remedy would 
be in any future case remains.  In Washington v. United States, the 
Court affirmed the district court’s decision to order the state to 
remove or fix all state-owned culverts that blocked access to salmon 
passage.90  This is a relatively straightforward remedy because there 
is a direct connection between physical structures and diminishment 
of the fisheries.  For other claims of resource impairments, a 
determination of an appropriate remedy may prove more 
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challenging due to the complexity of environmental claims and 
number of parties involved.   
VII. CONCLUSION  
The Ninth Circuit decision, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
requires the Washington state to meet its duty not to interfere with 
the PNW Tribes’ treaty protected rights and to correct its own 
actions as well as those of state-sanctioned private actors that either 
directly or indirectly limit those treaty rights. This newly defined 
obligation creates an opportunity for tribes, states, private parties, 
and federal agencies to develop guidelines to improve their 
relationships and improve the quality of the environment for the 
benefit of all citizens.  It is your co-authors hope that moving 
forward, we shall all be guided by the words of Chief Joseph and 
embrace our collective duty to protect the Earth. 
